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Superior Responsibility, Inferior Sentencing:
Sentencing Practice at the International Criminal
Tribunals
Christine Bishai*
Sentencing decisions are “the symbolic keystone of the criminal justice system.”1
[A] slap on the wrist of the offender is a slap in the face of the victims. -- Mark B.
Harmon and Fergal Gaynor, ICTY Prosecutors2
¶1

¶2

In the aftermath of the atrocities of the Second World War, international law developed a
doctrine under which superiors could be held accountable for the acts of their subordinates
during times of conflict such as civil war or genocide.3 This doctrine, known as “superior
responsibility”4 or “command responsibility,” acknowledges the social environment in conflictbased situations in which superiors’ failure to act provides tacit guidelines for the behavior of
their subordinates and others within the superiors’ sphere of influence.5 Superiors can thus be
held responsible for the criminal acts of their inferiors. The International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has gone as far as to state that “the criminal culpability of those
leading others is higher than those who follow.”6
However, successful prosecution of superior responsibility charges remains challenging.
For example, on November 16, 2012, the ICTY overturned the convictions of two Croatian
Generals notwithstanding the prosecution’s argument that the Generals were aware of the
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1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 1 (Alfred Blumstein, Jaqueline Cohen, Susan E. Martin &
Michael H. Tonry eds., 1983).
2 Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, The Sentencing Practice of International Criminal Tribunals: Ordinary
Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 683, 712 (2007).
3 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 241 (2d ed. 2008).
4 “Superior responsibility” is a term that is now often used interchangeably with “command responsibility.”
Historically, the command responsibility doctrine was initially confined to military commanders; however, it has
been expanded in the ad hoc tribunals such that even civilian superiors can be held liable for failing to prevent or
punish the crimes of his or her subordinates. I will use the more current and inclusive term of superior responsibility.
5 ILIAS BANTEKAS, PRINCIPLES OF DIRECT & SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 70
(2002).
6 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac & Zoran Vuković, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/I-T,
Judgment, ¶ 863 (Feb. 22, 2001).
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likelihood that their forces would deport villagers, plunder, and murder in four towns.7 The Trial
Chamber found that although they were generals, they did not possess “effective control” over
their subordinates.8
The full extent of the doctrine of superior responsibility has, however, remained largely
theoretical; although several superiors have been charged and convicted within international
criminal tribunals, few have been sentenced to the maximum punishments available to judges
within the broad scope of the latter’s discretion. Even individuals convicted on behalf of their
subordinates’ most serious crimes—for example, torture and willful killing—have received
sentences widely considered disproportionately short or lenient.9 Observers have noted the
startling discrepancy between the destructiveness and notoriety of a convicted individual’s
crimes and the judges’ sometimes baffling reluctance to hand down severe sentences.10
In this essay, I will examine the doctrine of superior responsibility, its existing
jurisprudence within international tribunals, and the relative lack of severity of the sentences
courts have issued to individuals convicted under the doctrine. In analyzing the latter, I suggest
that judges’ reluctance to severely sentence convicted offenders stems less from limitations on
the authority granted to them by statutes and case law than from judges’ analyses
overemphasizing a superior’s direct participation in the crime and its perpetration through an
ethnic or genocide-based motivation.
Part I provides an overview of the doctrine of superior responsibility; Part II describes the
sentencing guidelines and wide discretion judges have available to them in determining
sentences; Part III summarizes the jurisprudence on the subject generated by the tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court and analyzes the variables affecting judges’ decisions to issue relatively lenient sentences;
and Part IV looks to the purposes of punishment and offers arguments in favor of less lenient
sentencing and suggestions for potentially more just sentences of individuals convicted on
superior responsibility charges.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY

¶6

Under the doctrine of superior responsibility, first applied in the controversial Yamashita
case11 of 1946, superiors have a duty to refrain from issuing unlawful orders, as well as an
obligation to prevent or at least punish crimes perpetrated by their subordinates during the course
of a conflict. Scholars consider superior responsibility to be an omission-oriented form of
individual criminal liability wherein the commander can be punished for failing to act.12 Superior
responsibility is often cited as one of the primary justice-seeking tools at the disposal of
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina & Mladen Markač, IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶ 137 (Nov. 16, 2012).
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak & Mladen Markač, IT-06-90-T, Judgment (Apr. 15, 2011).
9 Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 2.
10 Id.
11 ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES: YEAR 1946 266, 269 (H. Lauterpacht et
al. eds., 1951). The Yamashita case (In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)) has been widely criticized due to the way
in which the Military Commission presumed the existence of the requisite knowledge on the part of the accused. In
his famous dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy pointed out that nowhere had Yamashita been charged with direct
responsibility for having personally committed or ordered the crimes in question, nor had it been alleged even that
he had any knowledge of their commission. Yamashita was simply accused of failure to provide the effective control
of his troops as required by the circumstances.
12 RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE SUBSTANTIVE PART 147 (Olaoluwa Olusanya ed., 2007).
7
8
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international tribunals. The doctrine is used to “establish the criminal responsibility of local or
central leaders of countries whose military, political, or administrative structures have been
involved in the commission of serious international crimes.”13
¶7
The doctrine of superior responsibility has been codified in the Statutes of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and, more recently, the International Criminal Court
(hereinafter, ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ICC, respectively).14 At the ad hoc tribunals, the contours
of the superior responsibility doctrine have been expounded upon in significant ways: superior
responsibility applies to civilian or political leaders and not merely to military leaders, and
superior responsibility can be implicated in internal conflicts within a given state or territory and
need not be for crimes in a cross-border conflict.15
¶8
The discussion of superior responsibility has included a debate over exactly what crime the
accused would be guilty of if convicted: would the superior be indirectly held criminally liable
for the crimes (e.g. torture) carried out by his subordinates or is the superior criminally liable for
his personal misconduct in failing to prevent or punish those subordinates responsible for the
crimes? This underlying idea was clarified in the ICTY Halilović case which articulated that the
latter is the basis for culpability— that is, the superior’s failure to act when he had a duty to do
so.16 The Halilović Chamber viewed superior responsibility—and not any imputed criminal
responsibility for the subordinate’s acts—as the basis of liability for the superior’s omission. The
ICTY stance is not to be confused with either strict or vicarious liability, which the tribunal has
consistently rejected as the foundational bases for apportioning guilt to a superior who failed to
act.17
¶9
Another notable aspect of superior responsibility is that causality between the superior’s
failure to prevent or punish and his subordinates’ criminal acts need not be demonstrated. 18
Similarly, the charge can only be invoked against a superior when the crimes of his subordinates
have actually been completed, and are not still inchoate.19
¶10
The ICTY first grappled with the scope of superior responsibility in the landmark Delalić
(Čelbići Camp) decision of 1998.20 Subsequent case law has continually cited and applied the
elements laid out in this decision. Upon acknowledging that the particular crime was committed,
13

Carla Del Ponte, Prosecuting the Individuals Bearing the Highest Level of Responsibility, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
516–17 (2004).
14 ICTY Statute, art. 7(3) (Sept. 2009); ICTR Statute, art. 6(3) (Jan. 31, 2010); SCSL Statute, art. 6(3), (Apr. 12,
2002); and ICC Statute, art. 28 (Nov. 29, 2010).
15 See generally, discussion on ICTR cases, infra Section IV(B)(2).
16 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilović, IT-01-48-T, Judgment, ¶ 54 (Nov. 16, 2005) [herinafter Halilović Trial, IT01-48]. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović & Amir Kubura, IT-01-47-T, Judgment, ¶ 69–75 (Mar.
15, 2006) [hereinafter Hadžihasanović Trial, IT-01-47-T] (“…because of the crimes committed by his subordinates,
the commander should bear responsibility for his failure to act. The imposition of responsibility upon a commander
for breach of his duty is to be weighed against the crimes of his subordinates; a commander is responsible not as
though he had committed the crime himself, but his responsibility is considered in proportion to the gravity of the
offences committed.”).
17 This has been rejected repeatedly in the ad hoc tribunals’ case law. See ICTY, Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalić,
Zdravko Mucić also known as “Pavo,” Hazim Delić & Esad Landžo aka “Zenga,” IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 239
(Nov. 16, 1998); Hadžihasanović Trial, IT-01-47-T, supra note 16.
18 Delalić et al., IT-96-21-T, Judgment, supra note 17, ¶¶ 398–400; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskić, IT-95-14A, Judgment, ¶ 77 (July 29, 2004).
19 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, IT-01-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 373 (Jan 31, 2005).
20 Delalić et al., IT-96-21-T, Judgment, supra note 17, ¶ 346.
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tribunals look for three essential elements of liability under superior responsibility: (i) the
existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (ii) the superior’s knowledge or reason to know
that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) the superior’s failure to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or to punish the
perpetrator thereof.21 Generally, one of the most difficult-to-prove elements is that the superior
had effective or de facto control over the subordinates. The absence of an existing de jure
hierarchical structure does not impede the ability to convict someone under the superior
responsibility doctrine.22
¶11
The other element that is often challenging for the prosecution to show is that of
knowledge or breach of the obligation to acquire knowledge about—or “turning a blind eye”
to—the crimes.23 The Rome Statute uses the stricter “should have known” standard of mens rea,
instead of “had reason to know,” the latter as defined in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.24
¶12
Prosecutors often have difficulty in proving that an individual is guilty of superior
responsibility and not merely guilty of direct perpetration of specific crimes.25 Superior
responsibility is among the forms of liability least likely to result in successful conviction under
international criminal law; it has been successfully applied in a very limited number of cases. 26
As of 2007, of the ninety-nine accused persons who had faced trial at the ICTY and the ICTR,
only fifty-four were prosecuted on a theory of superior responsibility and only ten were
convicted.27 This is because the aforementioned effective control and knowledge elements are
often very difficult to prove in, or after, a conflict situation. As the doctrine has developed, the
Chambers at the ICTY and ICTR have chosen to apply a rigorous and high threshold in finding
the existence of superior responsibility’s required elements.28 Even when faced with high-level
atrocities, the tribunal judges take the prosecution’s burden of production seriously. Morever,
even in cases involving atrocious crimes and bolstered by significant evidence, the prosecution
has had difficulty overcoming its burden.
21

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 377–78; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić (aka “Pavo”), Hazim Delić & Esad Landžo
(aka “Zenga”), IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 197–98 (Feb. 20, 2001); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić & Mario
Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 405–07 (Feb. 26, 2001).
23 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 249 (2d ed. 2008).
24 ICTY Statute, art. 7(3) (Sept. 2009); ICTR Statute, art. 6(3) (Jan. 31, 2010); and ICC Statute, art. 28(a)(i) (Nov.
29, 2010).
25 Beatrice I. Bonafé, Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 599, 602 (2007).
26 Id.
27 These do not include accused persons who have pleaded guilty under either article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute
(Todorović and Obrenović) or article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute (Kambanda and Serushago). These also do not
include the problematic cases of defendants convicted under both direct and command responsibility modes of
liability (Kayishema, Musema, Barayagwiza and Nahimana). See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Todorović, IT-95-9/1-S,
Sentencing Judgment (July 31, 2001); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenović, IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment
(Dec. 10, 2003); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment & Sentence (Sept. 4, 1998); ICTR,
Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, ICTR-98-39-A, Reasons for Judgment (Apr. 6, 2000); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Clément
Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment (Reasons) (June 1, 2001); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Alfred
Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment & Sentence (Jan. 27, 2000); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, JeanBosco Barayagwiza & Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment & Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003).
28 “[M]odern [tribunal] case law has relied on a more rigorous definition of command responsibility to make it
conform more closely with the principle of individual criminal responsibility and its corollaries, and in order to draw
a clear distinction between ‘direct’ and command responsibility. [A]d hoc tribunals have gradually displayed an
explicit preference for ‘direct’ criminal liability, where the accused can be convicted under both ‘direct’ and
command responsibility.” Bonafé, supra note 25, at 602.
22
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¶13

Prosecutors at the tribunals already face seemingly insurmountable hurdles in the routine
arenas of evidence-gathering, state cooperation, and their inability to arrest indicted persons.29
Consequently, prosecution teams at the tribunals sometimes make the strategic decision as to
whether to strive for the extremely difficult-to-prove charge of superior responsibility, in lieu of
the oftentimes simpler charge of direct perpetration. When the crimes are severe enough and
there is believed to be enough evidence, the prosecutor will hope for a conviction of superior
responsibility which, as a graver form of culpability, will presumably be given a harsher sentence
than the one accompanying a conviction of direct perpetration.
¶14
The overall sentencing practice at the tribunals has been widely criticized by commentators
as “inexplicably lenient” and an analysis of the sentences for those persons actually convicted on
superior responsibility charges shows that as a class, they too are receiving seemingly light
sentences.30 In the next two parts of this essay, I will analyze the factors affecting judges’
decisions to issue such disproportionately light sentences.
II. EXISTING SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND METHODOLOGY
¶15

The tribunal sentencing parameters afford judges a great deal of discretion in determining
the appropriate punishment for convicts of superior responsibility.31 The statutes of the ICTY
and ICTR do not provide guidelines or suggestions as to the length of appropriate sentences for
any of the crimes that fall under their jurisdiction. Chamber judges have “recourse to the general
practice regarding prison sentences”32 and are obliged to consider (but are not bound to follow)
the home countries’ respective sentencing practices for similar crimes.33 The only stipulation is
that the penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to “imprisonment for a term up to
and including the remainder of the convicted person’s life,”34 as the death penalty is not an
available form of punishment at the tribunals.35 The SCSL Statute is essentially the same, but
forecloses the option of a vague “life sentence” by going further and saying that (non-juvenile)
convicted persons shall be subject to “imprisonment for a specified number of years.”36 This
slight difference reflects the SCSL’s move toward a clear articulation of the number of years a
convicted person can expect to be imprisoned. Similarly, the Rome Statute prefers “a term of
imprisonment not to exceed thirty years”37 but “life imprisonment” can be used only “when
justified by the extreme gravity of the individual circumstance of the convicted person.”38

29

Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools: Three Difficulties
Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 403, 426 (2004).
30 Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 2.
31 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA,
AND SIERRA LEONE 563 (2006).
32 ICTY RPE, Rule 101(b)(iii) (July 24, 2009); ICTR RPE, Rule 101(b)(iii) (Oct. 1, 2009); SCSL RPE, Rule 101(a)(d) (May 31, 2012).
33 Delalić, IT-96-21-A, Judgment, supra note 22, ¶¶ 813, 816; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dušan Tadić, IT-94-1-A & IT94-1-Abis, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals, ¶ 21 (Jan. 26, 2000); Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, IT-95-14-A,
Judgment, ¶ 681 (July 29, 2004).
34 ICTY Statute, art. 24 (Sept. 2009); ICTR Statute, art. 23 (Jan. 31, 2010).
35 In accordance with the abolition of the death penalty in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 6(6), March 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
36 SCSL Statute, art. 19(1) (Apr. 12, 2002).
37 ICC Statute, art. 77(1)(a) (July 1, 2002).
38 ICC Statute, art. 77(1)(b).
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¶16

Beyond these basic limits, the statutes state that in “imposing the sentences, the Trial
Chambers should take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual
circumstances of the convicted person.”39 In fact, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has gone so
far as to call these the “primary consideration” and that “the sentences to be imposed must reflect
the inherent gravity of the criminal conduct of the accused,”40 again left up to the judges’
discretion. The Chambers have repeatedly emphasized the case-by-case nature of specific
criminal occurrences and the need to contextualize the particular circumstances of the case. 41
¶17
Thus far, most tribunal judges (particularly at the ICTY)42 have gradually rejected some
legal scholars’ notions that there exists—or should exist—a hierarchy of crimes or an abstract
ranking of criminal offenses.43 Rather, they emphasize that all crimes under their jurisdiction—
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—are extremely serious violations of
international humanitarian law.44 Accordingly, the judges affirm their freedom to evaluate the
“gravity” of a crime given its specific context.45 That said, the concept of gravity has generally
been construed to be comprised of two prongs: (i) ‘the particular circumstances of the case,’ i.e.,
magnitude of harm caused by the offender that can be shown through the scale of the crime or
number of victims, and (ii) ‘the form and degree of participation of the accused in the crime,’
i.e., the offender’s culpability.46 As I will discuss below, the ICTR has instead adopted an
approach which deems genocide to be the most grievous of all crimes.47
III. FACTORS AFFECTING TRIBUNALS’ SENTENCING PATTERNS
¶18

Given the sentiment that the criminal culpability of leaders should be greater than that of
followers48 and given the aforementioned broad discretion afforded to tribunal judges in
determining sentences, we might naturally expect that persons convicted of superior
responsibility would receive harsh sentences. However, an analysis of the tribunal case law at the
ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL paints a very different picture. Particular emphasis on the sentencing
judgments illustrates that judges ascribe varying degrees of importance to mitigating and
aggravating factors. The former may result in a lighter sentence, and the latter in a heavier
sentence than what might otherwise be considered a reasonable punishment for the specific
crime at issue. The Chambers have been careful to note that a judicial finding of mitigating
Delalić, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, supra note 17, ¶ 1191; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment,
¶ 591 (May 26, 2003).
40 Delalić, IT-96-21-A, Judgment supra note 22, ¶ 731 (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan
Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović, Dragan Papić & Vladimir Šantić, IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 852 (Jan.
14, 2000)); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 182 (Mar. 24, 2000).
41 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ranko Češić, IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 32 (Mar. 11, 2004).
42 Id.; See also infra notes 109, 114 on ICTR ranking of crimes.
43 Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence in International Criminal Law, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.
Q. 583, 607-609 (2002); Allison M. Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law
Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415 (2001); see also Olaoluwa Olusanya, Do Crimes against Humanity Deserve a
Higher Sentence than War Crimes?, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 431 (2004).
44 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho, ICTR-97-31-T, Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 18 (July 14, 2009).
45 Češić, IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 41.
46 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir
Lazarević & Sreten Lukić, IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 1213 (Feb. 26, 2009).
47 See infra notes 109, 114 on ICTR ranking of crimes.
48 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac & Zoran Vuković, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/I-T,
Judgment, ¶ 863 (Feb. 22, 2001).
39
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circumstances relates to the determination of the sentence and “in no way derogates from the
gravity of the crime nor diminishes the responsibility of the convicted person, or lessens the
degree of condemnation of his/her actions.”49 It mitigates the punishment, but not the crime.
¶19
The tribunals’ statutes themselves have codified judges’ ability to take certain factors into
consideration upon determining sentences. Whereas the judges may consider an accused person’s
mere following of a superior’s orders as a “mitigating” factor, in the case where the accused held
the position of authority, his punishment will not be mitigated.50 The Appeals Chambers at the
tribunals have held that aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
while mitigating circumstances can be established by a balance of probabilities.51
¶20
The judges also examine a myriad of mitigating and aggravating factors that they have
total discretion to use in determining their sentences. Commonly cited mitigating factors in
tribunal jurisprudence are the accused person’s: (1) substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor;
(2) operating under “superior orders”; (3) nature of the relatively minor or remote participation;
(4) personal circumstances, such as family situation or his health or age; (5) good character; (6)
admission of guilt; (7) expressions of remorse; (8) benevolent actions towards some of the
victims; (9) voluntary surrender to the Tribunal; and (10) comportment in detention.52
¶21
On the opposite end, aggravating factors include: (1) the abuse of a position of authority;
(2) the personal or direct involvement of the accused in the commission of the crimes; (3) the
discriminatory state of mind with which the acts were committed; (4) reprehensible or depraved
motives; (5) premeditated or enthusiastic participation in the commission of the crimes; (6) the
number of victims, their age and vulnerability, and the effects of the crimes on them; (7) the
brutal or vicious manner of circumstances in which the crimes were committed; and (8) the time
period during which the crimes were committed and their subsequent repetition.53
IV. ANALYSIS OF PROMINENT SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY CASES AND SENTENCES
¶22

In this section, I will analyze the primary cases that resulted in superior responsibility
convictions at the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL. I will then analyze a broader set of trends that can be
extrapolated from the tribunal decisions. In analyzing the sentences for individuals convicted of
serious crimes under a theory of superior responsibility, I argue that the sentences are
disproportionately and inappropriately lenient, irrespective of how the judges weighed the
mitigating and aggravating factors, and independent of the judges’ own characterization of a
sentence as lenient or severe. I argue that the lack of consistently severe sentences for the most
heinous crimes frustrates the very purpose of the tribunals—that is, avoiding impunity by
perpetrators and fostering tangible consequences with the hope of deterring future crimes.
Indeed, the doctrine of superior responsibility was conceived of to hold superiors more
Milutinović, IT-05-87-T, Judgment, supra note 46, ¶ 1150; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Elizaphan & Gérard
Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T, Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 886 (Feb. 21, 2003).
50 ICTY Statute, art. 7(2) (Sept. 2009); ICTR Statute, art. 6(2) (Jan. 31, 2010); SCSL Statute, art. 6 (2) (Apr. 12,
2002).
51 Delalić, IT-96-21-A, Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 763; Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, supra
note 48, ¶ 847; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 40 (Oct. 17, 2002).
52 GUENAEL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS, 351–53 (2005). See also Stephen
M. Sayers, Defense Perspectives on Sentencing Practice in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 764–72 (2003).
53 For more detailed analysis of the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence summarizing these factors, see M ETTRAUX, supra
note 52, at 350–51 nn.10–17.
49
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criminally and morally culpable for their failures to take action, in the face of their subordinates’
commission of crimes.54
A. Sentencing patterns at the ICTY
¶23

I offer two reasons underlying the ICTY’s handing down of relatively lenient sentences for
superior responsibility: (i) the literal-minded court continually ascribes more culpability to
“active participation” or direct involvement in crimes, even when the metaphorical harm from
“passive participation” is greater, and (ii) the international community and tribunals’ heightened
sensitivity to the lessons of WWII, with a particular opprobrium reserved for ethnically,
religiously, or nationally-motivated crimes.
1. “Active participation”

In 1998, the Čelebići camp case was the first superior responsibility case to be tried at the
ICTY.55 The notorious case involved the prosecution of three former commanders and a prison
guard of the Čelebići prison-camp where Bosnian Serbs were detained, tortured, and sometimes
killed. Of the four men on trial, two of them—Zejnil Delalić and Zdravko Mucić—were indicted
pursuant to the doctrine of superior criminal responsibility, and two of them—Hazim Delić and
Esad Landžo—based on individual criminal responsibility. Delalić was acquitted on all charges
as the initial Trial Chamber deemed him to have lacked the required command or control over
the Čelebići prison-camp and over the guards who worked there; therefore, he could not be held
criminally responsible for their actions. By contrast, Mucić, the commander of the Čelebići
prison camp, was found guilty of eleven of the thirteen counts for crimes committed by his
subordinates, by virtue of his position as de facto (and de jure) superior over the camp. The Trial
Chamber judgment held that Mucić had individual responsibility under article 7(1) for the
confinement of civilians and superior responsibility under article 7(3) for grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions and for violations of the laws or customs of war. He wilfully caused the
murder of nine victims, the torture of six victims and the great suffering of or serious injury to
four victims, committed inhumane acts towards six victims, and participated in the unlawful
confinement of civilians in inhumane conditions.56
¶25
In spite of this, Mucić was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, a sentence substantially
lighter than the sentences many jurisdictions in the U.S. assign to individual counts of
manslaughter or even, in some states, aggravated assault. The Chamber cited as a mitigating
factor that Mucić was not named by any witness as having had “active, direct participation, in
person, in respect of any act of violence or inhuman treatment.” Additionally, the Chamber
conceded that Mucić’s actions were a result of “human frailty” and self-preservation and not
“individual malice,” and that there were times where Mucić attempted to help some of the
detainees.57
¶26
When one considers the Chamber’s stated aggravating factors, however, its decision to
sentence Mucić to just seven years appears questionable. The judges stated emphatically that
¶24

54

See generally, Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility, 9 TULSA J. OF
COMP. AND INT’L L. 1 (2001); Eugenia Levine, Command Responsibility: The Mens Rea Requirement, GLOBAL POLICY
FORUM, Feb. 2005.
55 Delalić, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, supra note 17.
56 Id. ¶ 1242.
57 Id. ¶¶ 1247–48.
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they were “particularly appalled” by the fact that he was derelict in his duty as a commander to
oversee the detention center’s substandard living conditions and that he allowed his subordinates
to commit “the most heinous of offences without taking any disciplinary action.” They cite as
aggravating Mucić’s alleged attempt to intimidate a witness in the ICTY courtroom and his
attempts to fabricate evidence with his co-defendant.58 The Chamber also noted Mucić’s blithe
demeanor and general attitude throughout the trial and the fact that he often failed to display
“appropriate respect” for the solemn proceedings, exhibiting “a seeming lack of awareness of the
gravity of the charges against him.”59 Mucić appealed the decision while the Prosecution
appealed the inadequacy of his seven-year sentence, given the gravity of the crimes that occurred
under his supervision. In 2001, the second Trial Chamber again found Mucić guilty and
sentenced him to nine years imprisonment, later reducing the sentence by two years due to the
“credit” from his time in custody before the initial 1998 judgment.
¶27
A possible explanation for Mucić’s relatively light sentence was that the Chamber took a
very literal view of the crimes that occurred at Čelebići. The fact that they considered it a
mitigating circumstance that he did not have a physical hand in the commission of crimes seems
a misconstruing of the gravity of liability under the theory of superior responsibility. The
Chamber explicitly stated that Mucić was at all material times the ultimate commander of the
Čelebići prison camp and responsible for its “deplorable” and “inhumane” conditions.60
Additionally, the Chamber noted that “by means of deliberate neglect of his duty to supervise his
subordinates, thereby enabling them to mistreat the detainees in the Čelebići prison-camp…
[Mucić] was consciously creating alibis for possible criminal acts of subordinates.”61 I argue that
he should be punished under the doctrine of superior responsibility appropriately – that is heavily
– for fostering and encouraging a culture of lawlessness and impunity as its ultimate superior.
¶28
Contrasting Mucić’s sentence with that of the young prison guard Esad Landžo is
instructive in analyzing the Court’s emphasis on literal participation in crimes. Landžo was
sentenced to fifteen years on the same indictment for his direct participation in the willful torture,
murder, cruel treatment and for causing suffering and serious injury of camp prisoners. Although
not charged as a superior, Landžo’s direct liability for committing these crimes of torture
resulted in his stronger sentence. The Court took care to emphasize that despite the mitigating
factors of his youth, “impressionability and immaturity,” there were aggravating circumstances
in the “grotesque” and “sadistic” nature of his crimes62 and the “perverse pleasure” he took in
committing them.63
¶29
Similarly, the Čelebići camp’s Deputy Commander Hazim Delić who was directly under
Mucić’s authority, was not convicted on superior responsibility but was sentenced to twenty
years imprisonment (downgraded on appeal to eighteen years) for his individual responsibility
for torture, willful killings, and causing serious suffering or injury to detainees.64 As with
Landžo, Delić was apparently given a harsher sentence for having directly perpetrated several of
the crimes. The Court noted as aggravating circumstances his “singular brutality” in killing two
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Id. ¶ 1244.
60 Id. ¶ 1242.
61 Id. ¶ 1250.
62 Id. § VI (e.g., beating detainees to death, burning and cutting detainees’ tongues off, and nailing their foreheads).
63 Id. ¶ 1281.
64 Id. ¶ 1253.
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detainees and raping two defenseless women;65 he “took a sadistic pleasure” in the infliction of
pain on the detainees, often laughing during such acts.66
The glaring discrepancy between the sentences for Mucić and the two direct perpetrators,
Landžo and Delić, suggests that the Court underestimates the significance of a prison camp
commander’s role and authority. On Mucić’s watch, his subordinates committed numerous
serious crimes he knew of but left unpunished. By the nature of direct perpetration, the prison
guard and Deputy Commander were more involved physically; they were the individuals who
oversaw the prisoners every day. They may have known the detainees by name or by number—
predictably, they were more actively involved in the crimes. However, the professed purpose of
the superior responsibility doctrine is to punish the architects or commanders who allow the
commission of inhumane acts with impunity. If anything, the fact that Mucić created the culture
of criminality under which many more detainees suffered should mitigate the culpability of
lower level offenders like Landžo, not that of the commanders who set the tone and shaped the
atmosphere of the Čelebići prison camp.
Prosecutor v. Strugar resulted in another ICTY conviction under the theory of superior
responsibility.67 In 1991, Pavle Strugar was Commander of the Second Operation Group, which
was formed by the JNA (the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army) to conduct the notorious military
campaign against the Dubrovnik region of Croatia. He surrendered in 2001 and was charged and
convicted under both individual and superior modes of liability for violations of the laws of the
customs of war (article 3) including murder, cruel treatment, attacks on civilians, and devastation
not justified by military necessity. In 2005, the Trial Chamber identified as mitigating factors
Strugar’s voluntary surrender, family circumstances, old age, and deteriorating health, 68 but
ultimately found that Strugar had wielded effective control over the perpetrators of the 1991
Dubrovnik shelling campaign, that he had the material ability to prevent the crimes and to punish
his subordinates, and that he had failed to take reasonable measures to do so. Strugar was
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal in 2008, his sentence was reduced to sevenand-a-half years, but he was granted early release in the early part of 2009 due to his good
behavior in detention and significantly precarious health circumstances.
Observers may wonder why the Appeals Chamber would not recognize the extreme
culpability inherent in a superior’s allowing—if not planning—a massacre such as that of
Dubrovnik. Even if he did not “actively participate”—in the literal standards of the Court—in the
unlawful shelling, Strugar’s acceptance of the act renders him responsible for it. He failed to
punish his subordinates who conducted the literal shelling campaign against the coastal town, a
UNESCO World Heritage Site. The Chamber’s interpretation notwithstanding, I argue that
Strugar’s unwillingness to punish the perpetrators makes him an “active participant” in a
meaningful—though perhaps not literal—sense of the term, and as such, should be subject to an
appropriately heavy sentence.
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac arose out of events at the Kazneno-Popravni Dom (KP Dom), a
large prison complex situated in the town of Foča, where for fifteen months Milorad Krnojelac
served as a warden over the large number of non-Serb men who were detained for long periods
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67 Strugar, IT-01-42-T, Judgment, supra note 19.
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of time.69 He was initially convicted of both individual crimes (cruel treatment and persecution)
and superior responsibility charges (inhumane acts and cruel treatment) and sentenced to seven
and a half years’ imprisonment. The Court acknowledged his conformist personality that would
be reticent to confront aggressive subordinates70 and took into account as mitigating
circumstances his relatively advanced age,71 that he was a civilian mathematics teacher for most
of his adult life and not a well-trained military commander, the narrow geographic scope of the
crimes to which he was party,72 and that he was not a direct participant in the counts of murder
and torture. Although finding him guilty of individual (article 7(1)) and superior responsibility
(article 7 (3)), the Court chose to sentence him more as an individual aider and abettor of his
subordinates’ crimes, determining that his weak personality could undermine the fact that he was
truly a superior.73 Here again we see the Court reduce a sentence under superior responsibility
conviction because he had not directly perpetrated certain crimes at issue.
¶34
The Chamber cites as aggravating circumstances the fact that Krnojelac willingly accepted
the position as a superior at KP Dom,74 the “particular vulnerability of the direct victims, the
length of time over which the crimes continued during the accused’s tenure as warden of the KP
Dom, and the extent of the long-term physical, psychological and emotional suffering of those
victims,”75 as well as the fact that he appeared remorseless over his complicity in the crimes that
occurred under his watch.76 Both the accused and the Prosecution appealed the Trial Chamber’s
holding and Krnojelac was found guilty of additional crimes as a co-perpetrator and not merely
as an accomplice in imprisoning Muslim and Non-Serb civilians in inhumane conditions and
subjecting them to cruel treatment. This direct participation led the Appeals Chamber to increase
his sentence to fifteen years’ imprisonment.77 The Krnojelac decision is reminiscent of the one in
the Esad Landžo case: both men were guards or wardens with more “hands-on” roles, and both,
accordingly, received heavier sentences (fifteen years) than those of their superior commanders
(five to nine years). The case law corroborates this interpretation of the respective
responsibilities by suggesting that the form and degree of participation of an accused in the crime
is one of the elements constituting “gravity” that the judges will look to in sentence
determination.78
¶35
When the above cases are taken together, the ICTY’s emphasis on “active participation”
appears to be a misguided departure from the roots of the doctrine of superior responsibility. The
superior responsibility doctrine was developed precisely so that the failure to act becomes a
source of liability for culpable individuals who may not have “pulled the trigger,” so to speak.
For this reason, the ICTY made clear that “[t]he fact that the accused did not directly participate
may be taken as a mitigating circumstance when the accused holds a junior position within the
civilian or military command structure. However, the Trial Chamber considers the fact that
commanders, such as… [Blaškić] at the time of the crimes, played no direct part cannot act in
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ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, IT-97-25, Judgment (Mar. 15, 2002).
Id. ¶ 515.
71 Id. ¶ 519.
72 Id. ¶ 509.
73 Id. ¶ 173.
74 Id. ¶¶ 514, 516.
75 Id. ¶ 517.
76 Id. ¶ 513.
77 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 264 (Sept. 17, 2003).
78 Milutinović, IT-05-87-T, Judgment, supra note 46.
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mitigation of the sentence when found guilty.”79 Despite this explicit endorsement of superior
responsibility theory, which supersedes direct perpetration, tribunal case law has taken a
different course. Thus, when a court convicts pursuant to superior responsibility but sentences
leniently because of a perceived lack of “active participation,” it frustrates the purpose of the
doctrine itself.
2. Sensitivity to ethnically and religiously-motivated crimes
In Prosecutor v. Blaškić (the “Lasva Valley case”), Tihomir Blaškić was a Colonel in the
Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and was subsequently appointed a General and Commander of
the HVO in 1994. After being indicted on charges of both individual and superior responsibility
in connection with the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims, he voluntarily surrendered in 1996.
In 2000, the Trial Chamber found him guilty, sentencing him to forty-five years’ imprisonment.
At trial, although the Chamber cited the fact that he did not directly participate in the crimes and
his considerable responsibility at a relatively young age as mitigating factors,80 it found that in
this case, the aggravating circumstances—his non-cooperation with the prosecution, the great
number of victims, and Blaškić’s ideological and discriminatory motives— “unarguably
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.”81 During the attack in which Blaškić was implicated
to have given orders, many Muslim women, children, and adults were systematically murdered
and burnt alive in their homes, and their mosques destroyed. However, upon Blaškić’s appeal of
his sentence, the Appeals Chamber in 2004 reversed the majority of the Trial Chamber’s
convictions and sentenced him to a much reduced nine years’ imprisonment, subject to
shortening based on credit from his previous time in custody. Specifically on the count of
superior criminal responsibility, the Appeals Chamber found no evidence to show that he “knew
or had reason to know” beforehand about many of the crimes that occurred, and therefore the
issue of failure to prevent did not apply in this realm of the case. After the Appeals decision,
Blaškić was granted his request for early release in 2004.
¶37
The Blaškić Appeal decision is noteworthy in that although the majority of the counts were
stricken down, the accused’s culpability in convictions of ordering cruel and inhuman treatment
of civilians under superior responsibility remained. In sentencing, the Appeals Chamber cited as
mitigating factors his voluntary surrender,82 overall good character, status as a father to young
children,83 apparent remorse,84 and, most notably, his generally equitable treatment of Bosnian
Muslims before and during the war. The Court determined that in fact he was not particularly
discriminatory or ideologically biased against Bosnian Muslims; rather, he participated as a
professional soldier and a man of duty.85 This special aversion to ethnically or religiously-based
violence or persecution emerges as a trend underpinning many of the ICTY superior
responsibility decisions. The twentieth century’s developments in international human rights law
have been fueled to a great degree by the specter of the ideologically-driven atrocities of World
War II; as the Blaškić case demonstrates, aversion to this specter continues to affect courts’
rulings into the new millennium.
¶36

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, IT-95-14-T, ¶ 768 (Mar. 3, 2000); see Blaškić case discussion infra.
Id. ¶ 778.
81 Id. ¶¶ 774, 808.
82 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 702 (July 29, 2004).
83 Id. ¶ 708.
84 Id. ¶ 705.
85Id. ¶ 708.
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¶38

Indeed, subsequent cases at the ICTY make a point of noting the aggravated nature of
discrimination-related crimes; in the absence of this special aggravating factor, even especially
destructive or heinous crimes are punished with objectively light sentences. In Prosecutor v.
Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Brigadier General Enver Hadžihasanović was formerly a commander
and then Supreme Command Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH). 86 In 2006,
he was found guilty on the basis of superior criminal responsibility for murder and cruel
treatment and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for failing to take necessary and
reasonable measures to punish members of his forces who murdered prisoners of war and for
failing to punish his subordinates who treated civilians and prisoners of war cruelly in five
detention facilities throughout 1993. As in Blaškić, the Trial Chamber in Hadžihasanović cited
several ancillary mitigating factors—his voluntary surrender, status as a husband and father,
testimony as to his professionalism and good manners87—and one potent factor: “that he was not
ideologically driven by any religious or ethnic nationalist movements.”88 Although the Chamber
identified as an aggravating factor the “particularly heinous nature of [one victim’s] beheading”
and stated that “the prolonged period over which [the] crimes were committed [and the large
number or victims]89 warranted a more severe sentence,”90 the Brigadier General was sentenced
to only five years of the Prosecution’s requested twenty years.
¶39
In the same case, Amir Kubura was formerly the Chief of Staff and then Commander of
the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade of the ABiH. He was also found guilty on the basis of superior
criminal responsibility, for plunder of public and private property and was sentenced to two-anda-half years’ imprisonment. The Chamber held that he failed to take necessary and reasonable
measures to punish his subordinates who plundered private or public property in several villages
during the hostilities of 1993. The Chamber cited similar mitigating factors for Kubura as it did
for Hadžihasanović, once again highlighting that the accused did not seem to have harbored any
peculiar animosity against his opponents other than that of a commander for an enemy army. 91
Thus, although the Court emphasized that “Kubura was deeply involved in the commission of
the offence[s],” the sentence it handed down was a far lighter one than that available to it within
the broad discretionary parameters of the ICTY Statute. This landmark case was the first in
ICTY history in which individuals were convicted solely on the basis of superior responsibility,
enshrined in article 7(3) of the Statute, for their failures to prevent the crimes or punish the
perpetrators.92
¶40
Both men appealed their sentences.93 The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s
finding that Hadžihasanović failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or
punish his subordinates for the cruel treatment of detainees. However, in overturning the Trial
Chamber’s finding that he did not take necessary and reasonable measures to punish those
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović & Amir Kubura, IT-01-47-T, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Mar. 15, 2006).
Id. ¶¶ 2078–80.
88 Id. ¶ 2080.
89 Id. ¶¶ 2083–84 (“In this case, the Chamber notes that there were some one hundred detainees at the Zenica Music
School, while at the five detention centres in Bugojno, the detainees numbered several hundred.”).
90 Id. ¶ 2082 (“…the cruel treatment at the Zenica Music School took place over approximately a seven-month
period, and that the cruel treatment in the other detention centres created in Bugojno was inflicted over a period of
about three and a half months. In the view of the Chamber, the prolonged period over which these crimes were
committed warrants a more severe sentence.”).
91 Id. ¶ 2089.
92 Id. ¶ 2075.
93 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović & Amir Kubura, IT-01-47-A, Judgment (Apr. 22, 2008).
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responsible for the murder and abuse of prisoners, the Appeals Chamber reduced an already light
five year sentence to just over three years in prison. Likewise, the Appeals Chamber upheld
Kubura’s convictions for having failed to adequately punish the plunder that occurred under his
watch, but reversed the Trial Chamber’s holding that he did not take reasonable measures to
prevent further acts of plunder. His sentence was downgraded to two years’ imprisonment, but he
was released early in 2006 due to credit given to him for his time in detainment up till that point.
Neither the Trial Chamber sentence nor the downgraded Appeals Chamber sentence can be
characterized as heavy ones.
Here again, the ICTY demonstrates a heightened sensitivity to crimes that appear
motivated by ideology—ethnocide, racism, religious persecution—as opposed to crimes
committed entirely due to status as a military member engaged in relatively routine acts of war.
Defendants deemed by the court to lack an ideological “agenda” are therefore subject to lighter
sentences often dissonant with the destructiveness and gravity of the crimes of which they have
been convicted. While it is true that crimes expressing animus towards groups as a whole are
particularly insidious in many societies—hence the existence of “hate crimes” as a separate
category in many domestic jurisdictions around the world—the charges upon which these men
were convicted pursuant to superior responsibility should, I argue, result in far heavier sentences
than those issued by the ICTY.
Superiors’ responsibility over their subordinates directly contributes to and shapes an
atmosphere of lawlessness and impunity for crimes. Relatively light sentences such as those in
the above Eastern European cases undermine the very purpose of the doctrine, which developed
precisely to heighten, not diminish, the culpability of individuals in positions of authority who
may not have had direct “active participation” in the crimes they nonetheless helped cultivate or
hide.
Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović provides further support for my suggestion that
tribunals’ heightened sensitivity to ideologically-driven crimes is one of the lynchpins of
sentencing practice in superior responsibility cases.94 Naletilić was the founder and commander
of the Bosnian Croat “Kažnjenička Bojna” (“Punishment Battalion” or “Convicts’ Battalion”)
(KB), a 200 to 300-strong militia based in south-eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.95 Mladen
Naletilić was convicted on the basis of both individual criminal responsibility (article 7(1) of the
ICTY Statute) and superior criminal responsibility (article 7(3)) with several grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, acts of torture, forcible transfer, and persecution as crimes against
humanity. Significantly, the accused’s crimes were deemed to have indeed been committed on
political, racial, and religious grounds.96 The Chamber was emphatic that it considered no
mitigating circumstances and assigned Naletilić a single sentence of twenty years of
imprisonment, the longest of any superior responsibility convict at the ICTY. His status as
commander and co-founder of the KB, and his prominent stature and legendary reputation in the
region afforded him particular influence over his subordinates, who looked to him as the
example.97
Vinko Martinović was Commander of the “Vinko Škrobo” unit of the KB and subordinate
to Naletilić. Martinović “at least participated in the murder” of a man who had been brutally
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić & Vinko Martinović, IT-98-34-T, Judgment (Mar. 31, 2003).
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić & Vinko Martinović, IT-98-34-PT, Second Amended Indictment, ¶ 14
(Sept. 28, 2001).
96 Id. ¶ 34.
97 Naletilić, IT-98-34-T, Judgment, supra note 94, ¶ 751.
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beaten and mistreated before being killed by a gunshot through his cheek.98 He was also
responsible for and directly participated in rounding up the Muslim civilian population of Mostar
and unlawfully transferring, physically harming, and detaining them at the Heliodrom detention
center. Martinović was charged on the basis of both individual criminal responsibility and
superior criminal responsibility. As aggravating factors, the Chamber noted that he was found
guilty of “most heinous crimes,” including murder, and that his command role and influence on
his unit was significant.99 Rather than wield his considerable influence to prevent crimes, he
“permitted the commission of atrocities and was often a direct participant.”100 Martinović was
given a single sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment. The sentences of both Naletilić and
Martinović were affirmed on appeal.101
¶45
It may be that the Chambers sentenced Naletilić and Martinović to such comparatively
long sentences for their direct participation in some of the crimes that occurred on their watch,
but the Court emphasized the atmospheric persecution and particular targeting of Bosnian
Muslims during this conflict. Under the command of both defendants, the KB and other HVO
units identified persons of Bosnian Muslim ethnic background and prominently led their
evictions, arrests, and forcible transfers across the confrontation lines to the territories under
ABiH control. The defendants’ crimes were part of the broader Croatian Army and HVO’s
campaign to gain municipal control and force the Bosnian Muslim population to leave those
territories or to substantially reduce and subjugate that population, “commonly referred to as
ethnic cleansing.”102 This campaign is widely acknowledged to have displaced tens of thousands
of Bosnian Muslims and relied on “killings, beatings, torture, evictions, destruction of cultural
and religious heritage, looting, deprivation of basic civil and human rights, and mass expulsions,
detentions and imprisonments, all of them executed following a systematic pattern of ethnic
discrimination.”103 This subsequent extermination of Bosnian Muslims based on ethnicity and
religion appears to have been the dispositive factor in the relatively lengthy—by ICTY
standards—imprisonments to which both men were sentenced.
¶46
Whether or not the court reached an accurate or fair conclusion that certain defendants
were ideologically motivated while others were not is beyond the scope of my discussion here. In
focusing on the sentences resulting from the convictions summarized above, it is apparent that
the ICTY is willing to assign light sentences to individuals convicted of war crimes or crimes
against humanity under superior responsibility doctrine, provided the accused did not appear
personally or fundamentally motivated by an ethnic or religious supremacist ideology.
B. Sentencing patterns at the ICTR and why they are heavier than the ICTY
¶47

I offer two possible reasons for why superior responsibility-related sentences at the ICTR
have been significantly heavier than those in other tribunals including the ICTY: (1) the
underlying offense in the Rwandan cases was genocide, and (2) the ICTR Chamber seemed
particularly critical of the fact that the majority of superiors on trial were political or civilian
leaders—not military officers—who derogated their ethical duty to protect the community by
inciting hatred between segments of Rwandan society.
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1. Genocide as “the crime of crimes”
¶48

A major point of departure from the ICTY cases is the fact that, while the ICTY superior
responsibility indictments were for crimes against humanity and war crimes, the ICTR cases
were largely related to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, where approximately one million ethnic
Tutsis (and moderate Hutus) were massacred by members of the Hutu community.104 As
discussed above, although the ICTY has rejected an overt ranking of crimes, their sentencing
practice for persons convicted under superior responsibility appears to recognize the particular
grievousness of crimes motivated by ethnic or religious animus.
¶49
In 1998’s Prosecutor v. Akayesu,105 the first case to be heard at the ICTR, the Trial
Chamber found former school-teacher Jean Paul Akayesu guilty on nine counts related to
genocide and crimes against humanity in connection with the murder of at least two thousand
civilians who died in Taba, the rural commune where Akayesu was mayor.106 Signifying the first
instance where rape and sexual assault were deemed to constitute genocidal acts,107 he was
sentenced to serve nine concurrent life sentences for the charges. Akayesu had been charged
under individual responsibility (article 6(1)), but additionally, or alternatively, under superior
responsibility (article 6(3))108 for the crimes alleged. The Trial Chamber found as mitigating
factors that he had no prior criminal record, was “not a very high level official in the
governmental hierarchy in Rwanda and acknowledged that he made efforts to prevent the Taba
massacres.”109 Yet the Chamber held that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating:
Akayesu “consciously chose to participate in the systematic killings.”110 Although the Chamber
ultimately did not convict him under superior responsibility, 111 it noted that his status as
burgomaster made him more responsible for protecting the population, and he failed.112 Indeed,
“he publicly incited people to kill… he also ordered the killing of a number of persons, some of
whom were killed in his presence and he participated in the killings.” 113
¶50
In Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, & Imanishimwe,114 Imanishimwe was the
commander of the Cyangugu military camp where almost 3,000 civilian refugees were killed by
his subordinates. The Trial Chamber established his “direct” criminal liability for crimes against
humanity and war crimes (murder, imprisonment and torture). Beyond that, it found him guilty
of extermination and genocide under superior responsibility alone, which was unprecedented.
The court considered no mitigating factors and deemed it “particularly egregious” that as a
military officer with the mandate to protect, he allowed his subordinates to attack countless
civilians.115 He was sentenced to twenty-seven years, but on appeal in 2006, the court set aside
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ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, (Sept. 2, 1998).
Id. ¶¶ 178–93.
106 Id.
107 Id. ¶ 731.
108 Id. ¶ 691.
109 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence, 3 (Oct. 2, 1998).
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111 Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, supra note 104, ¶ 691.
112 Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence, supra note 109, at 8.
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114 ICTR, Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki & Samuel Imanishimwe, ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment
& Sentence (Feb. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Cyangugu Trial, ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment & Sentence].
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his superior responsibility convictions for genocide and extermination and his sentence was
reduced to twelve years in prison.116
¶51
As these cases demonstrate, the sentencing for genocide-related crimes is uniformly
harsher than for other types of crimes committed during times of conflict. This is not surprising
given the ICTR’s famous description of genocide as “the crime of crimes.”117 In determining
Akayesu’s sentence, the Chamber described genocide118 as “unique because it is of its element of
dolus specialis (special intent) which requires that the crime…be committed with the intent to
destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, [as such… is] crucial in
determination of a sentence .”119 In their sentencing, the ICTR Chambers tended to emphasize the
systematic brutality, savagery, and depravity of the crimes that were committed in connection
with the Rwandan genocide.
¶52
Another explanation for the uniformly harsher sentences—usually life terms—at the ICTR
may be the collective feeling of guilt stemming from the perception in some quarters that the
United Nations and the international community stood by and allowed the Rwandan genocide to
occur. Much has been written about the failures of the international community to intervene in
the bloody and senseless Rwandan situation in 1994. Now, with the ICTR in place, it appears
that justice can perhaps be served retroactively by holding some of the superiors involved in the
atrocities accountable. The longer sentences appear to reflect this goal.
2. Increased Role of Civilian Leaders in Rwandan Crimes
¶53

While the superior responsibility cases at the ICTY primarily involved only military
superiors or prison wardens, the ICTR tried many cases featuring civilian community and
political leaders. This expansion of the tribunal jurisprudence on superior responsibility led to
new prosecutorial challenges, particularly with establishing that the non-military superiors in
question had “effective control” over the actions of their “subordinates.”
¶54
In Prosecutor v. Kayishema,120 Clément Kayishema, the Prefect of Kibuye from July 1992
to 1994, was indicted for his superior responsibility for four massacres at various churches, each
resulting in the death of thousands of men, women and children. Kayishema was accused of
twenty-four counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the Common article 3 and
of Additional Protocol II, including murder, extermination, and other inhumane acts. In 1999, the
Trial Chamber found Kayishema guilty of four genocide counts related to each of the massacres.
He was sentenced to life in prison, and the Appeals Chamber confirmed his sentence in 2001.121
The Trial Chamber noted that Kayishema was responsible as a superior under article 6(3): he
exercised clear, definitive control over the assailants at every massacre site set out in the
Indictment and it had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Kayishema ordered the attacks
116

ICTR, Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki & Samuel Imanishimwe, ICTR-99-46-A,
Judgment, ¶¶ 379, 444 (Feb. 25, 2006).
117 Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence, supra note 109, at 3; see also ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR-9723-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 9 (Sept. 4, 1998) (defining genocide as “the crime of crimes,” crimes against
humanity as “crimes of an extreme seriousness,” and war crimes as “crimes of a lesser seriousness.”).
118 ICTR Statute, art. 2 (Nov. 8, 1994).
119 Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence, supra note 109, at 3.
120

ICTR, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-01-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 505 (May 21,
1999).
121 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana. ICTR-01-95-1-A, Judgment (Reasons), ¶ 363
(June 1, 2001).
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or, knowing of their imminence, failed to prevent them.122 Kayishema’s command responsibility
was inferred from his proven “direct” criminal liability.123
The Trial Chamber cited several aggravating factors, including the fact that Kayishema
abused the trust civilians had in him as a Prefect, the zeal with which he executed his crimes,
and, notably, his inaction with regard to punishment of the perpetrators.124 Further, the court
noted, “the massacres [of civilians] were carried out solely on the basis of ethnicity.125
The Kayishema decision demonstrates the ICTR’s confirmation of increased culpability
for direct perpetration of crimes, analyzed above, in the ICTY cases. Although it is difficult to
determine what Kayishema’s sentence might have been absent direct participation, the heavy
sentence also demonstrates that civilian leaders prominent in the community can sometimes be
found to have as much or more culpability than military ones based on the former’s status as
community leaders.
In Prosecutor v. Musema,126 the notion of superior responsibility was addressed and
expanded for Alfred Musema, the director of a profitable state-owned tea factory. Along with
other convictions for crimes for which he was found directly responsible, Musema was held
liable under superior responsibility for the acts carried out by the employees of his factory over
whom he was found to have effective control. This case was an important expansion of the
doctrine of superior responsibility outside the military context and into the context of a civilian
workplace.127 In Musema, the ICTR also provided interpretive guidance as to what sorts of
attacks could constitute crimes against humanity.
The only mitigating circumstances the Trial Chamber considered for sentencing were that
Musema admitted that a genocide had been committed against the Tutsis, his expression of regret
that the Gisovu Tea Factory facilities may have been used by perpetrators of crimes, and that he
was cooperative during the trial proceedings.128 The Trial Chamber found the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating: the extremely serious offense of which Musema was
found guilty, genocide, was described as “the crime of crimes”; armed with a rifle, he led
attackers, who killed a large number of Tutsi refugees; he raped a Tutsi woman, which set an
example for others to rape; he did not try to prevent the participation of the tea factory
employees or use of the factory’s vehicles in attacks; and he failed to use his considerable
influence to prevent or thwart the commission of the crimes, then took no steps to punish the
perpetrators over whom he had control.129 Musema was sentenced to life imprisonment, which
was later affirmed on appeal.130
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Kabiligi, Ntabakuze & Nsengiyuma131 included the trial of
Théoneste Bagosora, the most senior official at the Rwandan Ministry of Defense in 1994. He
and Kambanda are often cited as the primary architects of the Rwandan genocide.132 Bagosora
122

Kayishema, ICTR-01-95-1-T, Judgment, supra note 120, ¶¶ 515–16.
Id. ¶ 505.
124 Kayishema, ICTR-01-95-1-A, Judgment (Reasons), supra note 121, ¶ 36.
125 Kayishema, ICTR-01-95-1-T, Judgment, supra note 120, ¶ 638.
126 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment & Sentence (Jan. 27, 2000).
127 Id. ¶¶ 141–48.
128 Id. ¶¶ 1005–07.
129 Id. ¶¶ 966, 1001–04.
130 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, ¶ 399 (Nov. 16, 2001).
131 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze & Anatole Nsengiyumva, ICTR98-41-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 2022, 2270 (Dec. 18, 2008).
132 Id.
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was found guilty of genocide and a variety of crimes against humanity. The Chamber stated that
life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence for Bagosora: “[t]he toll of human suffering was
immense as a result of crimes which could have only occurred with his orders and
authorization.”133 On appeal, the Chamber overturned a count of his article 6(1) direct
responsibility, but affirmed his other convictions, including superior responsibility and his life
sentence.134
¶60
Also found guilty by the Trial Chamber were Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva and Major
Aloys Ntabakuze, commanders of the Para Commando Battalion, an elite unit within the
Rwandan Army. The Chamber found each of them guilty, as a superior, of genocide and several
crimes against humanity, sentencing each to life in prison. This case demonstrates that nonmilitary figures such as Bagosora, who was also given life imprisonment, were deemed by the
Court to have authority and influence over their followers to a degree comparable to that of
military commanders.
¶61
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze (“Media trial”),135 was an instance where
three civilian media-producers were charged with several crimes under individual responsibility
and also superior responsibility, as the masterminds of a Rwandan media campaign to
disseminate genocidal propaganda, dehumanizing the Tutsi population and inciting the Hutu
masses to engage in the slaughter of Tutsis. The three were found guilty on most counts and their
“positions of leadership and public trust”136 served as aggravating factors. The Chamber
emphasized how renowned university professor Ferdinand Nahimana used the radio, aware of
“the power of words,” to disseminate hatred and violence: “[w]ithout a firearm, machete or any
physical weapon, you caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians.”137 Former lawyer,
diplomat, and radio executive Jean-Bosco was described as “the lynchpin of the conspiracy” to
commit genocide.138 As owner and editor of a prominent newspaper, Hassan Ngeze abused his
public forum when he “poisoned the minds of his readers, and by words and deeds caused the
death of thousands of innocent civilians139 The trio were deemed in “the category of the most
serious offenders” with Nahimana and Ngeze sentenced to life imprisonment and Barayagwiza
sentenced to twenty-seven years (reduced from an initial thirty-five).140 On appeal, Barayagwiza
and Ngeze’s superior responsibility convictions were struck down, but their individual
responsibility convictions were affirmed. Barayagwiza’s sentence changed to thirty-two years
and Ngeze’s to thirty-five years. Nahimana’s individual convictions were vacated yet his
superior responsibility for persecution and incitement to genocide was affirmed and his sentence
changed to thirty years.141

133

Id. ¶ 2266.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora & Anatole Nsengiyumva, ICTR-98-41-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 720–21 (Dec.
14, 2011).
135 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza & Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment
& Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003).
136 Id. ¶ 1098
137 Id. ¶ 1099.
138 Id. ¶ 1100.
139 Id. ¶ 1101.
140 Id. ¶¶ 1103, 1105–08.
141 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza & Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment
(Nov. 28, 2007).
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Prosecutor v. Kambanda142 was a long-awaited case. As Prime Minister of the interim
government, Kambanda held the highest position in the Rwandan government. He pleaded guilty
to genocide and crimes against humanity and was found liable as a superior; he exercised control
over government ministers and military leaders involved in the genocide, issued orders
encouraging the murder of Tutsis, distributed arms and ammunition to groups involved in
murdering Tutsis, and gave public speeches for radio broadcasts, inciting massacres against the
Tutsi population. According to the Trial Chamber, “Kambanda committed the crimes knowingly
and with premeditation despite his being entrusted with the authority and duty to protect the
population.”143 The Court also found that “the aggravating circumstances…negate the
mitigating…especially since Jean Kambanda occupied a high ministerial post at the time he
committed the said crimes.”144 For this he was convicted of all six counts and sentenced to life
imprisonment (affirmed on Appeal).145
¶63
These cases demonstrate that the ICTR regards hate speech and the engineering of ethnic
or religiously-motivated persecution among the severest of crimes, and thus deserving of at least
one life sentence or its functional equivalent. Unlike the ICTY cases in which a lack of literal
“active participation” merited a lighter sentence, judges in the ICTR seem to more clearly
acknowledge the destructive influence wielded by those with power, whether conferred by
military rank or by the obedience of community members. The discrepancy can be attributable to
the notion, analyzed above, that genocide is sometimes considered a higher order of crime for
which active participation need not be found; hence, sentences for genocide-related crimes
related to superior responsibility may be harsher than for their non-genocidal counterparts.
¶64
However, the cases are also notable in illustrating the peculiar role that civilian community
leaders and public figures play in propagating genocide. Military leaders may have coercive
power over the civilians of their region or country, but not necessarily the power to cultivate
ideologies within large segments of the community. By contrast, civilian community leaders
such as the school administrators, diplomats, and radio and media figures in the above cases
wielded a uniquely potent form of power over local populations. Such powers contributed to the
incitement of genocidal ideologies within Rwandan communities, and the appropriately lengthy
ICTR sentences reflect that fact.
¶62

3. SCSL cases and emerging trends
¶65

The SCSL was created in 2002 as a hybrid court of the United Nations and government of
Sierra Leone to “try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law” during the Sierra Leonean civil war and since November 30,
1996.146 The court’s jurisdiction does not extend to genocide, but is primarily for crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and violations of Article 3 of Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II.147 Two important cases have resulted in convictions for superior responsibility in
connection with war crimes and crimes against humanity. Both involved military commanders,
not civilian leaders.
142

ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 4, 1998).
Id. ¶ 44.
144 Id. ¶ 62.
145 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-A, Judgment (Oct. 19, 2000).
146 About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, SCSL WEBSITE, http://www.sc-sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/Default.aspx
(last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
147 See generally, SCSL Statute (Apr. 12, 2002).
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The first judgments rendered by the SCSL were in 2007, for Prosecutor v. Brima, Kanu &
Kamara, known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (“AFRC trial”). Brima and Kamara
were Staff Sergeants, and Kanu was a Sergeant. The three were convicted as individually
responsible (under article 6(1)) and as superiors (pursuant to article 6(3)) for eleven of fourteen
counts for terrorism, collective punishments, extermination, murder (as a crime against
humanity), murder (as a war crime), rape, outrages upon personal dignity, physical violence (a
war crime), conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or
groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities, enslavement, and pillage. This was the
first instance that an international court had ruled on charges connected to child soldiers or
forced marriage, and the first time such a court delivered a guilty verdict for the military
conscription of children.
¶67
Brima was found guilty of direct perpetration of the murder of at least twelve civilians and
for being a “zealous participant” in crimes; he, Kamara and Kanu were directly responsible for a
host of the mutilations, looting, and civilian murders. Brima, Kamara and Kanu were convicted
of superior responsibility for the “particularly grotesque and malicious” mutilations that their
subordinates routinely engaged in.148 The Chamber found no mitigating circumstances for the
men and deemed as aggravating their lack of remorse for the crimes which were “heinous, brutal,
and targeted very large numbers of unarmed civilians and had a catastrophic and irreversible
impact” on the victims and their families; further, as a professional soldiers, they had the
knowledge of their responsibility and “duty to protect the people of Sierra Leone,” which they
certainly failed to uphold.149 The Chamber details the particular vulnerability of many of the
victims (civilians in places of worship and women or children subjected to sexual violence) and
the long timeframe within which the crimes were committed. Brima and Kanu were each
sentenced to fifty years in jail, and Kamara was sentenced to forty-five years’ imprisonment. In
2008, the Appeals Chamber denied their appeals and reaffirmed the sentences.150
¶68
The other relevant case at the SCSL is that of Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao in the
Revolutionary United Front (“RUF case”).151 Issa Hassan Sesay was Interim Leader of the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone and was indicted on seventeen counts for crimes
against humanity and war crimes; Morris Kallon was a former commander of the RUF, and
Augustine Gbao, was a senior officer and commander of the RUF. The RUF rebels were
notorious for their brutal attacks on civilians during civil war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002), often
cutting off the victims’ limbs. Although the three men pleaded not guilty, in early 2009 both
Sesay and Kallon were found guilty on sixteen of the eighteen counts on which they had been
charged, including liability as superiors for murder, enlistment of child soldiers, amputation,
sexual slavery, and forced marriage. Gbao was found guilty of fourteen of the eighteen charges.
Sesay received fifty-two years, Kallon forty years, and Gbao twenty-five years. The convictions
and sentences were appealed, but the Chamber reversed minor counts and affirmed the Trial
Chamber’s sentences.152
148

SCSL, Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara & Santigie Borbor Kanu, SCSL-2004-16-T,
Judgment, ¶¶ 45–46 (June 20, 2007).
149 Id.
150 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara & Santigie Borbor Kanu, SCSL-2004-16-A,
Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008).
151 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon & Augustine Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T, Sentencing Judgment
(Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter RUF Case].
152 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon & Augustine Gbao, SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (Oct. 26,
2009).
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The Sierra Leone cases are of note in that they fall in the middle of the spectrum for
superior responsibility-related crimes. Although the crimes were not classified as genociderelated as in the Rwandan tribunal, convicted defendants received lengthy sentences that are, I
argue, commensurate with the destructiveness and severity of the corresponding crimes.
Although one of the possible interpretations of SCSL sentencing patterns is that the perpetrators
demonstrated “active participation” in addition to their superior responsibility, it is my hope that
the Sierra Leone tribunal’s appropriately lengthy sentences signal a shift among all tribunals
towards longer sentences.
IV. REVISITING SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND PRACTICE: THE CASE AGAINST LENIENCY

¶70

Thus far, we have examined tribunals’ pattern of superior responsibility sentencing
practice and the factors affecting their choice of sentence. In this final section, I make a case for
the necessity of sentencing reform, and offer suggestions for tribunals’ sentencing practice with
regards to individuals convicted under the doctrine of superior responsibility.
¶71
Persons in superior positions are generally afforded a heightened degree of respect and
societal influence due to their role of authority. Yet this augmented status and power are counterbalanced by the superior’s responsibility to not abuse his position or duties. In an armed conflict
setting, the superior—often a high-ranking military commander or political leader—is uniquely
situated to explicitly support or condemn, or tacitly condone their soldiers’ or subordinates’
ostensibly criminal acts. Therefore, when a commander fails to punish his underlings, he
ultimately endorses or acquiesces to their offenses, and affirms the offenses’ legitimacy. 153 The
superior’s failure to punish, sanction, or censure bolsters the acceptability of the direct
perpetrator’s act.
¶72
Superior responsibility is sometimes criticized on the grounds that it potentially permits “a
few bad apples” or rogue subordinates’ crimes to impute liability on an innocently ineffectual or
unaware superior.154 Yet the superior responsibility doctrine indeed creates space for preventing
this injustice from occurring; the superior may not have had “actual knowledge” of his
subordinates’ crimes, but he can attempt to mete out an appropriate punishment or sanction once
made aware of the acts. As to the factual finding of “constructive knowledge,” where the Court
determines that the superior did not know but “should have known,” the burden of proof for the
prosecution is intentionally high. That way, superiors will not be easy targets for international
courts looking to make a statement and apportion blame for atrocities that occurred.
¶73
It is not only the superiors’ position that must be considered, but that of the crimes’
victims. There is “expressive” harm to the victim when a person of authority permits a crime to
go unpunished and it is tacitly accepted.155 The concept of expressivism in ethics theory is that
communication (or expression) is not simply a neutral stating of facts; rather, it is speech or acts
that represent emotions, beliefs, or evaluative judgments. The literal physical harm or injury to a
victim is accompanied by the psychological and emotional harm.156 Injuries of this sort result
from the perpetrator’s symbolic communication to the victim (and victim’s broader community)
153

Amy Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International Law, 30 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 251, 256–57 (2009).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 292.
156 See, e.g., Kenworthy Bilz & John M. Darley, What’s Wrong with Harmless Theories of Punishment, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1215, 1233–35 (2004).
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that, as the afflicted party, they have less value or worth. Accordingly, punishing the perpetrator
or wrongdoer can serve to restore the victim and mitigate his or her feeling of subordination.157
This re-balancing of the equilibrium between the parties is essentially a form of modern
retributive theory, which is less about punishment’s intrinsic goodness in matching moral evil,
and more about punishment’s authoritative expression of morally condemning the offense’s
evil.158
C. Purposes of Punishment
¶74

In domestic jurisdictions, the primary justifications for punishment are often cited as
retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence.159 The latter three are from the
Utilitarian school of thought, which emphasizes their socially beneficial effects.160 Mid-twentieth
century reformers in the United States were successful in deemphasizing the retributivist
(“revenge-like”) purpose, instead framing the articulated purposes of criminal punishment as
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence.161 However, the judgments at the various tribunals
indicate that a different mixture of objectives underpins sentencing in the international criminal
justice system—retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence of future mass crimes.162
1. Retribution

¶75

In fact, ICTY decisions have stated the primacy of retribution, and that rehabilitation and
deterrence should not be afforded too much weight in sentencing. 163 A fundamental goal of
retribution is that the “punishment fit the crime,” yet in cases of mass atrocity there is literally no
way to construct a punishment proportionate to the gravity of the crime.164 This inherent
impossibility was acknowledged when the Krajisnik Trial Chamber explained: “A sentence,
however harsh, will never be able to rectify the wrongs, and will be able to soothe only to a
limited extent the suffering of the victims, their feelings of deprivation, anguish, and
hopelessness.”165 The Hadžhadonivić Trial Chamber affirmed retribution as the primary
objective of punishment in determining a sentence, noting that it “…is not to be understood as

157

JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14 (1988).
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 234–35 (1968) (“In its most interesting form modern
retributive theory has shifted the emphasis from the alleged justice or intrinsic goodness of the return of suffering for
moral evil done, to the value of the authoritative expression, in the form of punishment, of moral condemnation for
the moral wickedness involved in the offense.” (emphasis added)). See also Michele Cotton, Back with A
Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution As an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1313–14 n.5 (2000) (“This expression of condemnation is retributive in that it is not intended to achieve deterrence
but is considered to have moral value in itself.”)
159 HART, PUNISHMENT, supra note 159, at 234–35.
160 Cotton, Back with A Vengeance, supra note 159, at 1314.
161 Id.
162 Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, The Sentencing Practice of International Criminal Tribunals: Ordinary
Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 711 (2007); see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 409–18, 461–63, 814–17 (2000).
163 Tadić, IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals, supra note 33, ¶ 48; Delalić, IT-96-21-A,
Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 806.
164 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Babić, IT-03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 44 (June 29, 2004).
165 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 1146 (Sept. 27, 2006).
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fulfilling a desire for revenge but as duly expressing the outrage of the international community
at these crimes.”166
2. Rehabilitation
¶76

Participants in mass atrocities tend to not fit the characteristic profile of career criminals in
domestic jurisdictions, the latter of whom are often prone to violent outbursts or require
maximum security measures. As described at length supra, many of the accused persons at the
tribunals occupied positions of military or political leadership. A report on the United Nations
Detention Unit in The Hague noted that ICTY detainees are characterized by a high average age,
strong internal discipline, and relatively good social skills.167 They do not appear to pose a
significant threat to society at this point, and have already been re-socialized. For this reason,
tribunal Chambers have explicitly downplayed the weight afforded to rehabilitation in
determining sentences for mass atrocities.168
3. Deterrence

¶77

As with rehabilitation, the ICTY has deemed deterrence a relatively low factor in
determining sentences for persons convicted of mass atrocities.169 It is impossible to assess the
deterrent effect that international tribunals have, whether “specific deterrence” of the accused
from committing further crimes or “general deterrence” of would-be perpetrators of similar
crimes and mass atrocities around the world.170 Yet supporters of the effort cite the importance of
the public message tribunals send to not only individuals, but also political leaders, governments,
and militaries – that there are legal consequences and potential punishment for the architecture or
participation in mass atrocities.
4. Sentencing Guidelines

¶78

Currently, the lack of any tangible sentencing guidelines complicates the predictability and
perhaps justness of sentencing. “The sentencing practice of international institutions remains
confusing, disparate, inconsistent, and erratic; it gives rise to distributive inequities.”171 One
Hadžhadonivić Judgment, IT-01-47-T, supra note 86, ¶¶ 2070–71 (citing Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment,
supra note 40, ¶ 185). See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemović, IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 64
(Nov. 29, 1996); Delalić, IT-96-21-A, Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 1234.
167 Independent Audit Of The Detention Unit At The International Criminal Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia,
ICTY WEBSITE (May 4, 2006), http://icty.org/x/file/Press/PR_attachments/DU-audit.pdf.
168 Delalić, IT-96-21-A, Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 806 (“Although both national jurisdictions and certain
international and regional human rights instruments provide that rehabilitation should be one of the primary
concerns for a court in sentencing, this cannot play a predominant role in the decision-making process of a Trial
Chamber of the Tribunal. On the contrary, the Appeals Chamber (and Trial Chambers of both the Tribunal and the
ICTR) have consistently pointed out that two of the main purposes of sentencing for these crimes are deterrence and
retribution. Accordingly, although rehabilitation (in accordance with international human rights standards) should be
considered as a relevant factor, it is not one which should be given undue weight.”). See also ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Miroslav Deronjić, IT-02-61-A, Sentencing Appeal Judgment, ¶ 136 (July 20, 2005).
169 Tadić, supra note 65, ¶ 48; Appeals Judgment, Delalić, IT-96-21-A, Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 801. See also
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac & Zoran Vuković, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment,
¶ 840 (Feb. 22, 2001).
170 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ranko Češić, IT-95-10-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 25–26 (Mar. 11, 2004).
171 MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2007).
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commentator has likened it to a “lottery system” or game of “Russian Roulette,” in that the
particular judges may have differing personal feelings on which crimes are most severe.172 The
ad hoc tribunals, particularly the ICTY, have garnered criticism from scholars who make note of
the seemingly lenient sentences that are sometimes bafflingly lower than those imposed by
municipal courts for crimes on a much smaller scale.173
Additionally, the lack of transparency and clarity in sentencing determination arises from
the fact that the sentencing hearings are not held after the judgments have been rendered. Rather,
the prosecution and defense teams at the ICTY and ICTR present any relevant information,
including during closing arguments, that may “assist the Trial Chamber in determining an
appropriate sentence if the accused is found guilty on one or more charges in the indictment.”174
Initially, the two courts employed the common law system’s separate sentencing hearings, but
they eventually amended their respective rules of procedure in favor of the civil law system’s
combined judgment and sentencing decisions.
The exact reasoning behind the shift in sentencing procedure was never announced,
particularly since the change may preclude a fair trial for the defendant, but it was likely that the
tribunals were attempting to streamline and expedite the trial process (bearing in mind the need
to bring in witnesses for testimony, and the added cost and time that a separate sentence hearing
entails).175
Beyond this, the tribunal sentencing practice at the ICTY and ICTR does not itemize what
portion of a convict’s counts result in what portion of their sentence. The SCSL has slightly
different procedural rules and has a separate sentencing hearing, which includes as enumeration
of the sentences for each count. Ad hoc tribunals generally can benefit from more transparent
sentencing procedures that, taking their cues from the SCSL, attribute specific sentences or parts
of sentences to specific individual crimes or counts.
In my analysis here, I have pointed out several factors I believe have contributed to the
discrepancies in sentencing severity among the various tribunals adjudicating superior
responsibility-related cases. I believe that courts’ literal-minded conception of “active
participation” negates the very principles that the superior responsibility doctrine was set up to
enforce. It is true that many individuals, described above, have been tried and convicted on the
basis of crimes that fall within their superior responsibility. However, their typically light
sentences do not always reflect that culpability. If tribunals are to fulfill the promise of justice
inherent in the doctrine, they must, in determining their sentences, relinquish their adherence to
literal-minded notions of active participation; only then will sentences correspond to the crimes
for which the superiors have been convicted.
Further, although it was likely not the intention of either tribunal, a comparison of the
ICTY and ICTR cases suggests that sentences vary in severity based on how the crimes can be
classified within international human rights law and policy. I argue that sentences should be
distributed based on the severity of the individual crimes, and not with respect to whether these
crimes fit within politically-informed parameters for “genocide,” or any other ranking of crimes.
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¶84

The tribunals have also generated some “best practices,” as well. The Sierra Leone
tribunal’s issuance of appropriately heavy sentences for crimes not classified as genocide is
promising. So, too, is the ICTR’s willingness to prosecute and convict civilians—especially
notable community leaders and media figures—for their indirect but no less instrumental roles in
inciting and propagating crimes of the most reprehensible nature. Currently at the ICC, the trial
of Jean- Pierre Bemba and his militia’s involvement in the Central African Republic is
unfolding. This is the first superior responsibility case to be heard there, and it would be
interesting to observe his sentence should he be convicted as a superior of crimes against
humanity and war crimes.
¶85
I argue that the ICC Chamber should move away from an “active-participation”
understanding of superior responsibility and hand down sentences in line with other criminal
tribunals more faithful to the original underlying concept of this doctrine. Given the ICC’s
unsatisfactory sentencing record for crimes associated with superior responsibility, I find
especially compelling Immanuel Kant’s contention that if those with the authority to punish “fail
to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices… [and the] ‘bloodguilt’ of the perpetrator’s crime
will come to rest with them.”176
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